NOTICE OF EXEMPT SOLICITATION |
1. Name of Registrant: |
Front Yard Residential Corporation |
2. Name of Person Relying on Exemption: |
Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. |
3. Address of Person Relying on Exemption: |
Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A., 40, avenue Monterey, L-2163 Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg |
4. Written materials: |
Attached hereto as an exhibit is a press release issued by Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A. to the shareholders of Front Yard Residential Corporation, dated June 19, 2020. This material is being submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-6(g)(1). |
1. | Will RESI commit to a strategy of selling its assets on an individual basis and, where advantageous, also on a portfolio basis? |
• | RESI historically stated that its assets have a value in the range of $16-$20/share. In support of the Amherst transaction, RESI noted that it would incur approximately $6.50/share in costs if it undertook to sell these assets on an individual basis. Employing an asset sale strategy could render net proceeds for shareholders that are equivalent to or better than the expected proceeds from the failed merger. |
2. | Will RESI commit to reinstating its dividend? Why did RESI suspend its dividend payment in the first place? |
• | RESI’s public company peers have continued paying dividends. RESI also received $100 million from Amherst as part of its termination of the merger agreement and recently noted on its earnings call that it had completed its best month in history. Additionally, RESI subsequently issued a press release on June 5, 2020 reporting that its April and May rent collections and occupancy performance were strong and in line with historical trends. Cash conservation does not appear to be a significant concern. |
3. | What issues did Amherst raise in connection with the merger that caused RESI to consent to the termination? |
• | RESI appears to have had specific performance rights and Amherst appears to have had committed debt and no right to terminate for a pandemic. |
4. | Will RESI commit to not pay compensation - bonuses, equity, golden parachute compensation or other change in control payments - to executives who by agreement are employees of and compensated by RESI’s external manager? |
• | RESI paid approximately $3 million in cash and equity in 2019 to executives who are employed and compensated by its external manager. RESI further committed to over $15 million in “golden parachute” payments to these same executives in connection with the failed Amherst merger. RESI should not be making these payments when RESI already pays its external manager, which is contractually responsible for these executives’ costs. We believe the financial burden to RESI of these massive payments is unwarranted, a waste of corporate assets and destroys shareholder value. |
5. | What is RESI’s cost reduction strategy? |
• | We believe RESI has a bloated cost structure that is substantially out of line with its peers. |
6. | Will RESI commit to replacing the two directors whom we believe appear to have a conflict of interest as it relates to RESI’s CEO? |
• | The director biographies available on RESI’s website suggest long-standing relationships among George Ellison, Rochelle Dobbs and George McDowell dating back to the time when all three were executives at Bank of America/Bank of America Merrill Lynch (“BAML”). We believe that Mr. Ellison was the catalyst for the nomination of his former BAML colleagues for election to RESI’s Board; as a result, we believe they could owe their directorships to Mr. Ellison, yet serve as two out of the three members of the compensation committee responsible for determining the unwarranted additional compensation payable to him, as well as other executives. We are concerned that this appearance of conflicts of interest compromises the objectivity and loyalty of these two directors particularly in light of the unwarranted payments to employees of RESI’s external manager. |
7. | What is the basis for RESI issuing the statement that the Board unanimously supports George Ellison and Robin Lowe despite the fact that they were placed on administrative leave by RESI’s external manager in connection with the external manager’s internal investigation? What does the external manager’s internal investigation concern? What is the RESI Board’s contingency plan if Mr. Ellison and/or Mr. Lowe are relieved of their positions as officers of its external manager? |
8. | Given that RESI issued its statement in support of Messrs. Ellison and Lowe on the same day that they were placed on administrative leave by AAMC, did RESI undertake an investigation into the circumstances giving rise to the two RESI executives’ suspension prior to issuing its statement? And if so, what were the findings of this investigation? |
9. | At the time the RESI Board approved June 22 as the date for the 2020 Annual Meeting, was the Board aware that had the Annual Meeting been scheduled just one day later, the nomination window would have been re-opened and shareholders would have been able to submit nominations? Why did the Board and management act in such an unfriendly manner to shareholders even after we brought this issue to your attention? |
10. | What was the date that RESI initiated its brokers search in connection with the 2020 Annual Meeting of Shareholders, and did that timeline satisfy the SEC regulation requiring 20 business days between the search initiation date and the record date? |